A jeu d'esprit, again from several years ago, about backs and religion. Chesterton would no doubt approve, as he was an admirer of both.
GOLDFARB v. GOD
In the Supreme Court.
Lucifer J:--This is a claim for damages and replacement parts by the plaintiff, a formerly upstanding citizen who alleges manufacturer's defect causing him to be unable to stand, walk, run, or perform other tasks and engage in other pleasures without pain resulting from problems associated with the skeleto-muscular area of his lower back.
The defendant is a Being of unknown address who claims to be everywhere at once and to have knowledge of and control over all events, past and present, including the outcome of the case now before this Court. The defendant questions the jurisdiction of this Court on the grounds of divine right, but since the Charter of Rights and Freedoms does not recognize such a right, the Court has decided to proceed.
The plaintiff alleges that after about thirty years of untroubled usage, his back began to bother him, at first occasionally and only when he lifted or pushed heavy objects, but lately in many more situations which he alleges should not cause pain but which he says do cause pain, to wit, riding on a bus, sleeping more than eight hours in his bed, playing street hockey, and so on. In especially acute episodes, he alleges continual pain or pain that comes on from simply turning or bending.
The plaintiff alleges that the defendant, being the manufacturer of the painful back in question, should be held liable for its defects, especially for its wearing out before its time, after a mere thirty to forty years of use. He is seeking compensatory and punitive damages or, in the alternative, a new back.
The defendant denies that he is the manufacturer of the body part in question, saying he merely established the prototype and that the plaintiffs' forebears are more directly to blame.
In the alternative, the defendant argues that even if he is deemed to be the manufacturer, he cannot be held liable for damage resulting from misuse of the product, which he says the plaintiff is guilty of for not exercising properly and for not practising good posture. He has presented affidavits from the plaintiff's mother stating that the plaintiff could often be found slouching as a child and that she frequently had to remind him to stand up straight.
The plaintiff argues that, without admitting the truth of the posture allegations, even if they are true they do not diminish the defendant's responsibility. The plaintiff also points to the contract entered into by the defendant in which the latter wrote or caused to be written that "The days of our years are threescore years and ten." The plaintiff argues that there is an implied warranty in this provision of the contract to the effect that human beings will live in reasonable health for seventy years, a warranty he alleges that the defendant has breached.
The defendant responds that the provision in question is not contractual but poetical and is merely an observation, not a covenant. He admits to entering into covenants with the plaintiff's ancestors, but says these had to do with grants of land in return for circumcision and had nothing to do with health in general or the health of backs in particular.
In the alternative, the defendant argues that even if there is a contractual element to the provision in question, all that it promises is a length of life, and it in no way guarantees a healthy or happy life.
The plaintiff argues that since the defendant is all-powerful he could easily fix the back in question or at least produce monetary compensation.
The defendant responds that whatever his capabilities, he is under no obligation to help the plaintiff, especially since he has hardly ever seen the plaintiff in a house of worship.
The plaintiff's final argument is that whatever the contractual obligations of the defendant, there is a common law duty of care which the defendant has breached by not ensuring that his products are safe and free of defect.
The defendant responds to this argument by reference to the doctrine of "caveat emptor," or "buyer beware," to which the plaintiff responds by saying he was not a buyer. The defendant states that he is willing to agree to that point and in fact uses it to question the plaintiff's standing to bring this suit at all: the plaintiff, he says, is not a buyer or an heir or the recipient of a gift; it is hard, in fact, to see what interest the plaintiff has in his back.
The plaintiff suggests that landlord and tenant law might apply, but he has been unable to produce any lease agreement covering his back.
This Court is of the opinion that the plaintiff has not made out a case against the defendant and that, as the defendant alleges, the plaintiff has no standing even to bring such a case.
The case is dismissed with costs to be paid to the defendant.